Although quantum communication systems are being deployed on a global scale, their realistic security certification is not yet available. Here we present a security evaluation methodology for a complete quantum communication system. We have subdivided the system into seven layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow, and categorised its known implementation imperfections by hardness of protection and practical risk. To illustrate the use of our methodology, we report security evaluation results of a sub-carrier wave quantum key distribution system and the follow-up interactions between the manufacturer and the security evaluation team. This has led to improvements in the system security. We hope our method enters future standards for quantum cryptography.
Although quantum communication systems are being deployed on a global scale, their realistic security certification is not yet available. Here we present a security evaluation methodology for a complete quantum communication system. We have subdivided the system into seven layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow, and categorised its known implementation imperfections by hardness of protection and practical risk. To illustrate the use of our methodology, we report security evaluation results of a sub-carrier wave quantum key distribution system and the follow-up interactions between the manufacturer and the security evaluation team. This has led to improvements in the system security. We hope our method enters future standards for quantum cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of relying on assumptions of computational hardness like most other classical cryptography protocols, quantum cryptography relies on the laws of physics for providing information-theoretic security. From the first theoretical proposal in 1983 [1] to the recent key exchange via satellite over 1200 km [2] , quantum key distribution (QKD) has come forward a long way. Over the course of time, the journey has been (and is still being) impeded by a number of attacks that exploit the deviations between theory and practice in a quantum-optical part of the system implementation [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Ironically, as a consequence of the attacks, QKD has been equipped with improved protocols and tools like decoy states [13, 14] , measurement device independence [15] , device-independence [16] , twin-field QKD [17] and so on. As a result, QKD today is much more secure and efficient in practice than it was 20 years ago.
It is now time for QKD to be expanded and deployed on a larger scale. As the push from the lab to practical deployment is initiated in various parts of the globe, a number of security, compatibility and connectivity issues are needed to be solved. These demand developing universally accepted standards and certification methodologies, and also the formation of a common platform * shihan.sajeed@gmail.com † viegorov@corp.ifmo.ru for collaboration and addressing these issues. To fulfil this need, ETSI has had an industry specification group for QKD (ISG-QKD) since 2008 that provides a platform for the creation of universally accepted standards and promotes coordination, cooperation and standardization of research for QKD [18] [19] [20] . Development of security certification standards is at present being discussed in this group and in other standards organisations such as International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU). At the same time, several recent studies attempt to introduce certification of countermeasures against specific vulnerabilities in the quantum optical part. For example, Ref. 21 studies the security of a photon source in a fiber-based QKD system against a general Trojan-horse attack (THA) [22, 23] . By treating the attack as an information leakage problem, the secure key rate becomes a function of the specifications of the installed optical components. The latter can be characterised when necessary. A similar approach has been suggested for other individual imperfections [12, [24] [25] [26] . A methodology to characterise and secure the source against several imperfections is under development [27] . Attention to several imperfections and attacks is being paid when designing QKD equipment [28] .
Although these studies have addressed several individual vulnerabilities, no complete system analysis has yet been reported. This is what we do in this work. We lay out a methodology for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system against all known implementation imperfections in its arXiv:1909.07898v1 [quant-ph] 17 Sep 2019 quantum optical part. For this purpose, we first propose a layered structure that subdivides the complete system into seven layers. This allows us to see what layers belong to the scope of analysis done this work, and what layers fall into classical information security domain that should be tackled separately by a team with a different expertise. Then we categorise each implementation imperfection in the quantum optical part -expected or existing in the system -in terms of hardness of solution. This allows us to assign a risk level to each of them, which is useful for the manufacturer for prioritising patch development.
Our proposed methodology requires an iterative interaction: security evaluation from the testing team; then patching from the manufacturer; then again security evaluation, and so on. Throughout this iterative process, the system security is gradually expected to reach a level that can be trusted and widely accepted. As an example of using this methodology, we present the results of our initial security evaluation performed at ITMO University and Quantum Communication Ltd. (St. Petersburg, Russia) in 2017. They are therefore the first commercial QKD manufacturer to openly publish the security assessment of their system. We also present a follow-up work that has been done by the manufacturer as a response to our initial evaluation. It consists of theoretical and experimental studies that have allowed the manufacturer to quickly improve implementation security of their product by patching its most prominent loopholes [29] [30] [31] . We hope that our methodology will pave the way for developing security evaluation and certification standards for complete quantum communication systems.
The security evaluation team has performed a similar initial analysis in 2016 on the QKD system Clavis3 from ID Quantique (Switzerland) and on 40 MHz QKD system from QuantumCTek (China). The follow-up with the latter is currently in progress. While the methodology of these projects has been similar to that reported in this Article, their content remain confidential at the request of the manufacturers.
The Article is organised as follows. Our proposed layered architecture of the complete quantum communication system is presented in Sec. II and our severity rating scheme for the implementation imperfections in Sec. III. We describe the system under test in Sec. IV and its initial security analysis results in Sec. V. The follow-up work by the manufacturer is presented in Sec. VI. We conclude in Sec. VII.
II. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION LAYERS
Security analysis of a complete quantum communication system is a complex procedure that requires different areas of expertise. To simplify the job and ensure that people with specific expertise can tackle the right problems, it is necessary to subdivide the implementation complexity into layers. In our security analysis, we have subdivided the system implementation into seven layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow and control as presented in Table I . Our layer structure is conceptually similar to the open systems interconnection (OSI) model for telecommunication systems [32] . Just like OSI layers, a layer in our system serves the layer above it and is served by the layer below; however, unlike OSI, all our layers are inside one system, and most of them are not abstraction layers. When a generic system is installed, it starts with the top layer: Q7 installation and maintenance; then operation and processing is subsequently initiated in each underlying layer until it gets down to handling quantum states in Q1 optics layer. Once the optics layer generates photon detections, they are again processed in each layer above in sequence until the top layers: either Q6 handing the secret key over to the application that has requested it, or all the way up to Q7. Below we explain the functioning of each layer with examples.
The lowest layer Q1 handles the photonic signals that carry the quantum states and service functions. The next layer Q2 interfaces the optical components with digital processing and possibly performs some analog signal processing. It contains analog electronics and digital-analog converters. Q3 comprises digital and software algorithms that immediately control the electronics and optics, including its calibration aspects. It might contain, for example, a set of algorithms to maintain avalanche photodiode (APD) temperature, bias voltage, gating. The next layer Q4 is software that decides which Q3 layer subroutine to run. For example, it decides when APDs need to be cooled, or when gating control should be initiated. The next layer Q5 processes the raw data generated by the protocol to distill secret keys. The layer above Q6 handles the communication between the quantum protocol and the classical application that asks for the service of the protocol. Finally, the topmost layer Q7 handles issues in any underlying layer that require human intervention, even if the human follows a checklist. We have found that the system evaluated in this Article, as well as several other QKD systems [33] , allow a clear division into this layer structure.
We remark that an initial theoretical proposal of a quantum communication protocol (such as Refs. 1 and 34) covers a part of the single layer Q5, while being mostly ignorant of the other layers except their few selected aspects. However practical security loopholes can be present anywhere in the complete implementation and be in any of its layers. The implementation of each layer has high technical complexity and contain tens of optical components, operator's checklists, thousands of electronic components and lines of software code. The task of security analysis is to find all the loopholes. 
III. QUANTIFYING HARDNESS AGAINST IMPLEMENTATION IMPERFECTIONS
When an implementation imperfection is suspected to be security-critical, it is necessary to evaluate the security risks. The first step is testing. If it is found to be compromising the security then the next step is to design a countermeasure solution, and the last step is checking the robustness of that solution. This procedure is often a loop, because most countermeasures in turn need to be tested. In an attempt to standardise this process, we have categorised the implementation imperfections in terms of existing solutions as shown in Table II . The lowest state CX indicates that the imperfection is suspected to be a potential security issue, and needs to be further analysed or tested before a conclusion can be made. After an imperfection is found to be security-critical, its state becomes C0, i.e., insecure. Next, a solution needs to be developed that provides security against the original attack model. At this state the solution is expected to be robust and the state is considered to be C2. After it has been integrated into a security proof, the state can be shifted to C3: solution secure. However, often it may be the case that newer attack models are found that bypass the countermeasure; then the state moves to C1, which means the solution is robust only against a specific attack model but not against others or a combination of the original and some other attacks.
For example, in ID Quantique Clavis2 QKD system, the bright-light detector control attack became C0 upon its discovery in 2009 [3] , was reclassified C2 after being patched in 2015, then downgraded to C1 next year after the patch was demonstrated to be inadequate against a modified attack [10] . A similar development can be traced for another imperfection, a variation of detector efficiency with angle of the incoming light [7] . It was suspected to be a security vulnerability (CX) up to 2015, then proven to be so (C0) in 2015 [7, 37] , then moved to C2 by the use of a pinhole and later brought down to C1 after the results presented in Refs. 9 and 38.
We emphasize that the categorisation of a specific vulnerability reflects only the existing knowledge about them, and may change with time as seen from the above discussion. Also the categorisation of a particular imperfection is specific for each particular system. For example, an imperfection in the single-photon detectors may be classified as insecure (C0) but the same imperfection might be irrelevant (C3) for a system running a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol.
Eventually, the goal of the manufacturer (and security certification) should be to update the system such that all imperfections are on the level C3. Level C3 should be TABLE II. Hardness against implementation imperfections. Here we propose a classification scheme quantifying how robust a given system or countermeasure is against a given imperfection. The hardness level is assigned to each particular imperfection and the same imperfection at different systems may be assigned different levels. For each imperfection the hardness level reflects current knowledge, and may change over time.
Hardness level Description Examples
C3. Solution secure Imperfection is either not applicable or has been addressed with proven security.
The threat of a photon-number-splitting attack on multiphoton pulses is eliminated by the decoy-state protocol [13, 14] ; detector imperfections are made irrelevant by measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [15] ; statistical fluctuations owing to finite sample size are accounted by finite-key post-processing.
C2. Solution robust
This is the status of many countermeasures after their initial design. With time this state may move up to C3 after a security proof is completed, or down to C1 or C0 after working attacks on it are found.
Phase-remapping in Clavis2 [4] (the imperfection is there, but any known attack attempting to exploit it causes too many errors); long wavelength Trojan-horse attack on Bob in Clavis2 [11] (the use of a narrowpass wavelength filter appears to be sufficient given that any known remaining attack causes too many errors).
C1. Solution only partially effective
Countermeasure is successful against certain attack(s), but known to be vulnerable against at least one other attack or a modification of the original attack.
Random-efficiency countermeasure against detector control in Clavis2 [10] ; pulse-energy-monitoring system in Alice against Trojan-horse attack [6] ; pinhole countermeasure against detector-efficiency-mismatch attacks [7] .
C0. Insecure Security-critical imperfection has been confirmed to exist, but no countermeasure has been implemented.
Laser damage attack on the pulse-energy-monitoring detector in Alice in Clavis2 [9] and on optical attenuators in several systems [31] ; photon emission caused by detection events in single-photon detectors [12, 35] .
CX. Not tested Imperfection is suspected to exist and be security-critical, but has not been tested. considered good for a commercial product, while levels C1, C0 and CX should be deemed inadequate and need to be remedied by a security update or new product development. Level C2 lies in the gray zone and while it may be considered secure for practical purposes, i.e., adequate for a commercial product, one should remember that it has no theoretical security proof based on quantum mechanics. However, the development of security proofs taking into account imperfections can -in some cases -be a slow process, and we expect many of them to attain C2 earlier than C3.
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION OF ITMO'S SUBCARRIER WAVE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
In the rest of this Article we demonstrate how our proposed security evaluation and certification methodology can be applied to a specific system. As an example, we select the subcarrier wave quantum key distribution (SCW QKD) system manufactured by ITMO University and its spin-off company Quantum Communications Ltd. The manufacturer has provided us with an overall design specification of the system along with further oral information and written notes on various aspects of design and manufacturing process. We had physical access to the hardware but, at the time of initial evaluation, did not perform any experiments on the setup. Following the methodology from Sec. II and Table I , we have subdivided the system implementation into seven layers and performed a complete security analysis of the bottom four layers (Q1-Q4) that correspond to optics, analog electronics, driver and calibration algorithms, and operation cycle of the system. For these layers, we aim to examine all suspected implementation security issues according to the current knowledge. For higher layers Q5 and up (from QKD protocol post-processing and up), we cannot perform a complete security evaluation as they lay outside our expertise area; they should be analysed by a team with expertise in classical information technology security. Nevertheless, we have pointed out a few issues in the layer Q5.
The results of this security evaluation have initially been delivered to ITMO in a confidential report in February 2018 (prepared by those authors not affiliated with ITMO). The content of that report is presented in Sec. V, after we briefly introduce the system to the reader.
The subcarrier wave QKD principle was proposed in 1999 [39] and experimentally demonstrated later the
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Basic subcarrier-wave QKD scheme. Insets show optical spectra at different points in the setup. ATT, optical attenuator; PSM, electro-optical phase shift modulator; SF, notch spectral filter; SPD, single-photon detector.
same year [40] . It was initially conceived as a practical fiber-optic system offering an alternative to thendominant polarization and time-bin encoding schemes that would require a precise alignment during operation [39] , as well as to "plug-and-play" systems developed a year earlier [41] that limited QKD source repetition rate due to an intrinsic two-pass architecture.
More recently, SCW QKD has been demonstrated as being robust against external conditions affecting the telecom fiber [42] , allowing increased spectral density [43, 44] , and being invariant to telescope rotation in open-air links [45] . Its viability has been experimentally demonstrated for metropolitan area telecommunication lines [46] , multi-user [47, 48] and software-defined [49] networks. A basic design of the SCW QKD system is shown in Fig. 1 . In Alice module, a continuous narrow linewidth laser acts as a light source. This radiation with frequency ω is usually referred as carrier wave, or simply a carrier. It passes through an electro-optical phase modulator, to which an electrical driving signal with frequency Ω is applied. As a result, two subcarriers (or sidebands) with frequencies ω − Ω and ω + Ω appear in the optical frequency spectrum, as shown on the inset in Fig. 1 . Quantum information is encoded in the phase shift ϕ A between the carrier and the subcarriers, which is induced by phase modulation of the electrical driving signal [42] . Four phase states (0, π/2, π, 3π/2) are used in both Alice and Bob modules. After modulation the signal passes to the quantum channel through an attenuator. Carrier power, modulation index and attenuation value are chosen so that the mean photon number µ sb (on two sidebands combined) meets the protocol requirements. On Bob side a similar modulator introduces phase shift ϕ B resulting in single-photon interference on the sidebands. An optical filter separates the carrier from the sidebands, and the latter are detected on a single-photon detector. The registered optical power depends on the difference |ϕ A − ϕ B |. If Alice and Bob introduce equal phase shifts constructive interference is observed, and the optical signal power at the sidebands differs from zero. In the opposite case, when the difference equals π, destructive interference occurs and the registered counts correspond to dark noise of the detector. Instances when the difference is π/2 are discarded during sifting. Key bits are obtained from the registered counts using algorithms similar to a phase-encoded BB84 protocol [42, 50] . A full quantum description of the system and the implemented protocols can be found in Refs. 29 and 50.
V. POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES
Based on the received information about the system, we have identified a number of potential security issues that might be exploitable by an adversary Eve. A summary of them is given in Table III . Almost all the identified issues require further detailed analysis, and in many cases, indepth experimental testing in a laboratory. We assign a hardness C-level (see Sec. III) to each issue to reflect the state of the corresponding solution. For many issues, this level is CX, meaning the issue's applicability to the system implementation needs to be studied and tested. We specify in which system implementation Q-layers each issue is located, according to the classification introduced in Sec. II.
The risk evaluation listed in Table III is based on a guessed likelihood of the vulnerability, expected fraction of the secret key leakage, and estimated feasibility of exploit technology. This risk estimate is useful for the manufacturer with limited resources to prioritize the problems. Vulnerabilities that can be exploited using today's technology and deliver the full secret key to Eve are a more immediate threat. They should be addressed before those that require future technology or provide only partial key information (thus requiring of Eve an additional classical cryptanalytic task). We remark that we have followed this strategy and tested the two highest risk hardware issues after the delivery of the original evaluation report (see Sec. VI). The security proof and implementation of post-processing have also been completed after the report.
More security issues may be discovered in the future once the system design and operation are examined in greater detail. We now explain the identified issues.
A. Detector control attack
Two types of detectors are used in the present implementation: ID Quantique (IDQ) ID210 gated APD and Scontel TCORPS-CCR-001 superconducting nanowire singlephoton detector (SNSPD). Among them, Scontel SNSPD is at least partially controllable by bright light [54] [55] [56] . Whether the same was true for ID210, required experimental testing. From our previous measurements on ID Quantique Clavis2 QKD system, we know that it is possible to blind its detectors by sending a continuouswave (c.w.) light of power P blind = 0.3 mW [10] . Then by choosing a trigger pulse power P tr greater than the threshold power P th = 0.15 mW, it is possible to force a However, sending a trigger power P tr at the subcarrier frequency will not work as the photons will be shifted to another frequency due to Bob's modulation. Instead, Eve needs to inject extra photons in the reference signal frequency so that they are shifted to the subcarrier after the modulation and trigger a click in the blinded detector. Due to the small m in the present system, the reference power required by Eve is P ref ≈ P tr /m. For example, for m = 0.05, a 1 ns trigger pulse at the subcarriers with peak power P tr > 0.15 mW [10] just before the detectors would require a 1 ns wide reference pulse with peak power of P ref > 3 mW at Bob's input. This is an easily generated and transmitted optical power. The strategy of the faked-state attack is as follows.
Let's assume first that there is no reference monitoring implemented in the system. Let's assume Alice encodes phase ϕ A . We further assume that Eve -sitting outside Alice's module -measures the signal (using similar measurement setup as Bob) by randomly applying ϕ E ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}. Another part of her -sitting near Bob -sends bright c.w. light of power P blind to blind Bob's side-band detector. When ϕ E = ϕ A , she gets a detection. In this case, she recreates the referencesubcarrier pulse pairs scaling their powers up to make P ref = 3 mW. When Bob also measures in the same basis as Alice-Eve and ϕ E = ϕ B (ϕ E = ϕ B ± π), this results in constructive (destructive) interference and will (will not) trigger a click in the blinded sideband detector. If Bob and Eve select different bases, Bob should not register any detection. For the slots when Eve gets no detection due to ϕ E = ϕ A or low detection efficiency, she simply does nothing owing to the absence of reference pulse monitoring and these events will appear as loss to Bob.
In order to successfully perform this attack in practice, the blinded detector should be characterized to know P never and P always , which are the thresholds of the trigger pulse power making the detector never click and always click. The trigger pulse power P tr in the successful attack needs to satisfy the conditions
However, if reference monitoring is implemented, both the reference and sideband monitoring detectors would be blinded and Eve will need to modify her strategy. When she has a conclusive outcome, she proceeds as before. However, when her measurement outcome is inconclusive, i.e., ϕ E = ϕ A , Eve needs to tailor the power of the reference signal in such a way that it is enough to force a click on the blinded reference detector but not on the subcarrier detector. Note that, sometimes Eve gets a detection when measuring in the opposite basis as that of Alice and has no way to know if her measurement result coincides with Alice's bit. However, these states are either not detected at Bob due to Eve-Bob bases mismatch or detected and then discarded during sifting due to Alice-Bob bases mismatch.
B. Laser damage
Whether the current system is vulnerable to laser damage attack (LDA) [9, 57] , can be ascertained only after experimental testing. Since one of attenuating components, a variable optical attenuator (VOA; FOD 5418) in Alice is the closest to the channel (see Fig. 2 ), it will be the first target for Eve's LDA. Eve can send high power laser to damage the optical attenuator to reduce its attenuation. If successful, lights coming out of Alice will have higher mean photon numbers than permitted by the security proofs, thus compromising the security.
It will also be interesting to experimentally check the effect of laser damage on the optical PMs to see whether LDA can affect m. If it can, then further studies need to be conducted to check whether it leads to a denial of service or a security compromise. Finally, if LDA can reduce the insertion loss for either the phase modulator (PM), linear polarizer (LP), fixed optical attenuator (FOA) in Alice or the polarization beamsplitter (PBS), PM in Bob, it may facilitate other attacks, e.g., Trojan-horse attack. Hence, these components must be characterized meticulously against LDA.
C. Trojan-horse attack
In SCW QKD protocol, after sifting, Alice and Bob keep only the outcomes for which they both used the same phase, i.e., ϕ A = ϕ B . Thus if Eve can extract information on either ϕ A or ϕ B by performing a Trojan-horse attack (THA) [22, 23, 58] , the security will be compromised. With current technology, Eve needs a mean photon number µ B→E ∼ 4 to perform homodyne detection [58] . Our security evaluation of the system against THA is detailed below.
Alice
In the present scheme (Fig. 2) , possible sources of reflection are the linear polarizer (LP; Thorlabs ILP1550PM-APC), fixed optical attenuator (FOA; Fibertool FC-FC 15 dB), optical isolator (OI; AC Photonics PMIU15P22B11) and all the standard optical connectors placed after the phase modulator (PSM1) (i.e., at its side facing away from the quantum channel). We identify that one of the strongest sources of reflection is the LP with 45 dB return loss. Assuming the VOA is set to 70 dB (which is a typical attenuation value required by the SCW QKD protocol), and insertion loss of each connector is 0.3 dB, the total round-trip attenuation experienced by a Trojan photon is about 186.8 dB. This means, in order to get one photon out, an eavesdropper needs to send 4.79×10
18 photons per pulse into the system, which -considering a phase change frequency of f = 100 MHzcorresponds to injecting a power of 61.4 MW at 1550 nm. This is way above the tolerable limit of standard fibers, which suggests the risk of Trojan-horse attack on Alice side is relatively low. It is also important to check the reflection from the OI, which requires experimental testing. Finally, this analysis should be repeated for lower attenuation settings of the VOA and the risk should be evaluated accordingly. Note that, wavelength can also be an attack variable [11] and it is important to mea-sure experimentally the actual value of reflected power from LP, FOA, OI and the connectors for a large range of wavelengths that Eve could in practice use.
Bob
The risk of THA on Bob seems to be comparatively higher than that at Alice since there is no attenuator or isolator in Bob's module (Fig. 3) . The return loss (RL) of the polarization beam combiner (PBC) just after PSM2 is 50 dB while the insertion loss of the polarization beam splitter (PBS), PSM2, and each of the three connectors is 0.48, 1.7, and 0.3 dB. In order to get µ B→E photons out of Bob, Eve needs to inject a power of
where h is the Planck constant, c is the speed of light, λ is the attack wavelength, and l is the total loss in dB experienced by the Trojan photons. Assuming the point of reflection is the PBC just after the phase modulator, and Eve uses λ = 1550 nm as her attack wavelength, the total loss experienced by a Trojan photon will be l = 56.2 dB. This means that in order to get a single photon out, Eve needs to inject a power of only P E→B = 5.35 µW, which is quite feasible. Note that ID210 runs in gated mode with afterpulsing. So, Eve can send the Trojan photons just after the gate but still inside the phase modulation window. However, this may cause a high level of afterpulsing in Bob's single-photon detectors [58] . Scontel TCORPS-CCR-001 has no afterpulsing but it runs in continuous mode thus making it difficult for Eve to send Trojan photons. Eve can resort to a longer wavelength (such as 1924 nm) to reduce both the afterpulsing side-effect [11] and also the probability of the Trojan photons to be detected. As a result, wavelength filters are also necessary in Bob. Nevertheless, afterpulsing characterization of detectors along with characterization of the wavelength filter at longer wavelengths are necessary in order to prevent THA.
To summarise, the secure key rate in the presence of THA -under reasonable assumptions -was calculated for both single-photon and decoy state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol in Ref. 21 . These results were based on Alice's ability to upper bound the outgoing mean photon number µ out . Similar analyses should be performed under assumptions appropriate for the present scheme to upper bound µ out . This should be a future study.
D. Need for carrier monitoring
In a photon number splitting (PNS) attack [34, 59] or unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [6, 60] , Eve needs to suppress some pulses. But, in the SCW QKD system, if Eve suppresses the subcarrier pulses, and passes only the carrier pulses, this will cause extra errors in Bob. This necessitates the suppression of both the subcarrier and reference pulses so that they appear to Bob as lost signals. To prevent this, Bob must monitor the arrival of reference pulses. However, based on our discussions with ITMO's engineers, we learned that the monitoring of the reference signal might not be implemented partly due to implementation complexity and partly because they do not deem it necessary for security, because Ref. 50 shows that the system is secure against a collective beam splitting attack over a large distance. Here, we emphasize that even though the system is secure against the collective beam splitting attack from Ref. 50 , more general attacks might be possible to compromise the security. The attack is as follows:
• Eve intercepts Alice's signals just outside Alice's module and splits a tiny fraction x of it.
• Eve performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement on the split signal [60] .
• If no photons are found, she splits another fraction x. She does this until her induced loss equals the line loss.
• When photons are found she keeps them in her quantum memory and sends the rest of the signals to Bob via a lossless channel. The state of each photon in her possession is
where a † and b † are the creation operators on the carrier and subcarrier modes respectively, m is the modulation index and ϕ A is Alice's phase encoding.
• For different values of ϕ A ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}, Eve's states are not orthogonal. To make them orthogonal to each other, Eve needs to apply a filtering operation
This turns |ψ e into |ψ e = (a
with a success probability
• When the bases are revealed during sifting, Eve simply measures |ψ e in the correct basis to extract ϕ A .
This attack is more general than the collective beam splitting attack from Ref. 50 . This is because, in Ref. 50 , for a line loss η Eve uses a (1 − η) : η beam splitter and the attack only succeeds when both Eve and Bob receive a photon. This becomes less likely as the line loss increases. However, in the present case Eve is not restricted to split in the (1 − η) : η ratio for the line loss η, which gives her more power. Thus, the security proof should be updated to include the more (and ideally the most) general attacks than the collective beam splitting attacks.
E. Manipulation of reference pulse
Here we assume that the reference pulse monitoring is implemented in the system and analyse the consequences. If care is not taken during the implementation, there might still be ways for Eve to perform the USD attack as explained next.
First, Eve intercepts Alice's signal just outside Alice's lab and performs a USD measurement [61] . For any conclusive measurement, she prepares the same state with a higher mean photon number and sends it to Bob via a lossless channel, in order to maximize his detection probability. For any inconclusive measurement, she still needs to send the reference signal to Bob and wants it to be detected. However, sending only the reference signal while suppressing the sidebands does not work (see Sec. V D). Instead, Eve wishes the subcarrier signal detection probability to be as low as possible while still keeping the reference signal detection probability as high as possible. The number of photons in the subcarrier and reference signal -after Bob's modulation -is given in Ref. 50 as
Here, µ 0 is the mean photon number of the reference pulse, η(L) is channel transmission, η B is transmission in Bob module, and α is additional loss induced by Eve. |d s 00 (β )| is the Wigner d−function that decides the number of photons to be shifted from reference to side-bands based on its argument β , which itself is a function of the modulation index and the phase difference between Alice and Bob.
We assume that avalanche photo diodes (APDs) are used for the detection of both the reference and subcarrier signals. Then the detection probability in mode i ∈ {ref, sb} is P can be compensated by adjusting the power of the pulses sent during the conclusive measurement cases. The only limitation on α is that P ref det should not be lowered significantly for Alice and Bob to notice. A countermeasure to this attack can be to monitor the reference and subcarrier detection rates. However, a further study is required to find the optimal strategy to monitor the reference and subcarriers and also designing the monitoring detector, determining µ 0 , monitoring threshold, and m.
F. Time-shift attack
We suspect that it might be possible for Eve to control the time delay of the reference and side-band signals relative to the synchronization pulse to shift their arrival times into a specific moment inside or outside the phase modulation window. This might make the system vulnerable against time-shift attacks (TSA) [62] . A time-shift attack can be performed on the SCW QKD system as follows. For ease of understanding, let us first assume that there is a time gap between successive phase modulation windows, and outside the modulation windows the phase is 0. We assume a faked-state attack in which Eve stays outside of Alice's module and performs USD of Alice's states. Whenever she obtains a conclusive outcome, she sends the same state ϕ E to Bob in the correct time window (i.e., she does not alter the arrival time). When Bob measures in the same basis, and ϕ E = ϕ B (ϕ E = ϕ B ), he gets a click (no click). However, when Eve obtains an inconclusive outcome, she generates a ϕ E = π state and sends it outside the phase modulation window. Since outside the modulation window the phase applied is 0, this ensures no detection by Bob's detector.
In our discussion with the developers, we learned that in the current SCW QKD implementation, there is no gap between successive phase modulation windows. However, at the transition region from one window to the next, there is a fast fluctuation. Thus, it will be interesting to know what effective phase shift is experienced by a pulse if it is sent at the time interval corresponding to the fluctuations. For example, if the effective phase shift is ϕ 0 , then it might still be possible for Eve to remain inconspicuous during the inconclusive measurement slots by sending a state ϕ E = π + ϕ 0 . However, the feasibility of this attack can only be ascertained by experimental testing. For that, one needs to characterize Bob's phase modulation windows -including the transition regionsin the time domain for all phase values. Click processing by Bob will also need to be checked for detection times in the transition regions.
G. Privacy amplification method
In the composability framework of QKD [63] , to achieve -security, it is required that Alice and Bob estimate the upper bound of Eve's information on their key up to the end of error correction step, and apply a proper universal-2 hash function. This is done to generate a shorter secret key such that the probability that the key is not perfect and the protocol did not abort is bounded by . However, the present system does privacy amplification by first calculating secret key size and then randomly discarding bits in the error-corrected key to match that calculated secret key size. The disadvantage of this random key removal procedure compared to hashing is that Eve can listen to the classical communication between Alice and Bob and follow the exact procedure to discard bits from her own set. At the end, -security cannot be guaranteed. To make the secret key -secure according to the composability framework, the proper implementation of privacy amplification using the hash function is advised.
H. Finite-key-size analysis
In the present system, the size of the raw key is limited by the size of Alice's memory (1 Mbit). According to the developers, this leads to a sifted key size of ≈ 20 kbit for a distance of 12 km. For a larger distance of 200 km, the size becomes as low as ≈ 10 kbit [42] . 10% of this sifted key is used for parameter estimation. This small sample size has a high probability to lead to discrepancies between the estimated and actual parameter values due to finite-size-effects [64] . Since the present security proof used by the developers does not consider the finite-keysize effects, the system might be vulnerable to them. Based on our previous analysis on a different system [65] , we know that the finite-size effects become significant when the sifted key size is lower than 200 kbit. At that size of the sifted key, the system -without finite-sizeanalysis -generated a larger secret key than the upperbound set by the finite-key-size analysis. Thus, security of the generated key was not guaranteed. Since the siftedkey size of 20 kbit in the present system is much lower than 200 kbit, we strongly suspect that finite-size effects are significant. Thus, we advise to develop a thorough finite-key analysis. To do this, any deviation of parameters due to finite-size-effect needs to be analysed. An example of this effect is the collision probability, i.e., the probability of a hash function mapping two different input keys to the same output key. Other examples could be found in Refs. 52, 63, 66-68.
I. Non-quantum random number generator
In the present system, three types of random number generators (RNGs) are used. One is a pseudorandom number generation software drand48 r from Linux operating system. The second is a commercial product manufactured by the developers of this QKD system. The third one is the internal RNG of Altera Cyclone IV fieldprogrammable gate array (FPGA) chip. Using a pseudorandom generator (or randomness expansion) does not satisfy the randomness assumption of security proof. For the other two generators, care should be taken to verify the quantum origin of the random numbers and the quality of implementation.
J. Intersymbol interference
Owing to the limited bandwidth of the driving electronics, high speed systems might exhibit intensity correlation among the neighboring pulses -an effect known as the intersymbol interference or the pattern effect [69, 70] . The electronic signal applied to the modulator might be dependent on the preceding pulse, which violates the assumption of security proof. This may lead to vulnerability. Testing should be done in order to assess the risk of the intersymbol interference in the present system.
VI. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES AND FOLLOW-UP
After the analysis reported in Sec. V, we have performed laboratory testing of the two potential hardware vulnerabilities with the highest rated risk (see Table III ). For both of these, the testing has confirmed the vulnerability's presence. For the detector control attack (Sec. V A), we have tested both detector units and found that ID210 is fully controllable by bright light [30] , while Scontel SNSPD with a built-in electronic countermeasure (recently developed by Scontel) is partially controllable and the countermeasure in it needs to be improved [56] . In particular, the optical power required to control ID210 can easily be generated and transmitted through Bob's optical scheme [30] , confirming our original risk assessment. Technical countermeasures against this attack are currently under consideration. We remark that this vulnerability remains unsolved in most existing QKD systems [71] .
For the laser damage attack (Sec. V B), we have performed laboratory testing of the VOA unit (FOD 5418) and found it to be severely vulnerable to the LDA [31] . A brief application of ∼ 2.8 W c.w. laser power damages a metal film layer inside this component and reliably reduces its attenuation by ∼ 10 dB, which renders the key insecure. A countermeasure currently under consideration is to insert another component between the line and the VOA, in order to prevent the latter from being exposed to high power. Candidates for this other component are being tested [72] .
The manufacturer has designed countermeasures for the above attacks on the hardware and implemented them in the current version of the SCW QKD system. They will be tested experimentally as a part of future work.
Protocol-related issues have been addressed as follows. A proof of security for a general attack, the lack of which has been highlighted in Sec. V D, has been developed [29] . It is summarised in Sec. VI A below. The issues related to both the USD attack (Sec. V E) and reference pulse (Sec. V D) have been closed by an analysis of advanced USD attack and appropriate countermeasures [73, 74] . We recap these results in Sec. VI B below. Finally a correct privacy amplification method (Sec. V G) and finite-key analysis (Sec. V H) have been included in Ref. 29 . The finite-key analysis is recapped in Sec. VI C below. Since these issues appear to have been addressed by this recently published theoretical work, we have updated their current hardness level in Table III to C3. Several other issues from Table III have also been analysed and patched by the manufacturer. Overall, our joint work has allowed ITMO University and Quantum Communications Ltd. to quickly patch most of the loopholes by introducing countermeasures. The implementation hardness levels have been raised from C init of CX and C0 at the time of the initial report to the current state C curr of mostly C2 or even C3. Countermeasures marked C2 may eventually become C3, after additional experimental testing and improvement. The two groups also continue to jointly verify the protocol security proof.
A. Asymptotic security
We assume here, that the family of protocols considering in this paper belongs to the class of one-way QKD protocols with independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.) information carriers and direct reconciliation. It is commonly accepted that secure key generation rate K for the protocols of this class in the presence of collective attacks in asymptotic regime is lower bounded according to [75, 76] by the Devetak-Winter bound [77] (8) where ν S is the repetition rate; P B is the probability of successful decoding and accepting a bit in a single transmission window; Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER), the probability that a bit accepted by Bob is erroneous; code EC (Q) is the amount of information revealed by Alice through the public channel for the sake of error correction, which depends on QBER and is limited by the Shannon bound: code EC (Q) ≥ h(Q) where h(Q) = −Q log 2 Q−(1−Q) log 2 (1−Q) is the binary Shannon entropy. Quantity χ(A : E) in Eq. (8)) is the Holevo capacity, giving an upper bound for amount of information accessible to eavesdropper Eve in a given collective attack (quantum channel). It is well-known that coherent attacks in i.i.d. case can be bounded with collective attacks. So one usually considers coherent attacks as general collective attacks [78] in terms of arbitrary unitary operations on purified states in enlarged Hilbert space (described in terms of isometry) provided by Eve.
In Reference 29, the result of arbitrary isometry is considered in order to estimate Holevo capacity in complementary channel. Eve performs unitary operation (described by isometry) between states in the channel and Eve's ancillas to make them (in general case) entangled in some way [79] . It has been shown that Holevo capacity of complementary channel is maximized when states become untangled (but interacted). Further considering the property of isometry, i.e., preserving the overlap between the states, it has been shown that highest mutual information between Alice and Eve is bounded by the Holevo bound. This statement eliminates the necessity to consider particular kinds of isometries.
In case of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution Holevo bound can be found considering reduced unconditioned channel density operator, i.e., considering only two states since Eve can wait to measure her states after reconciliation. Therefore the obtained Holevo bound using binary Shannon entropy function h(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) of the unconditioned channel density operator eigenvalues is as follows:
where µ 0 is the amplitude of the coherent state on the of carrier wave determined by the average number of photons in a transmission window provided with coherent monochromatic light beam with optical frequency ω, d
S 00 (β) is the Wigner d-function from the quantum theory of angular momentum [80] , and β is determined by the modulation index m [50] .
B. Advanced unambiguous-state-discrimination attack
The collective attack that considers a mutual information between Alice and Eve might not be the most general attack. There might be attacks that decrease conditional mutual information I(A; B|E) to zero. An example of such attack has been introduced in Ref. 74 where Eve performs an errorless USD measurement [81, 82] then blocks inconclusive results and alters (amplifies and adds errors) the distinguished states. The latter is necessary to maintain both detection and error rates. In Reference 74 the condition of revealing Eve's actions [83] is generalised as
where P det is an expected detection probability and P USD is the probability of unambiguous state discrimination.
Obviously there are two main strategies to increase the performance of the system. The first is to increase P det and the second is to decrease P USD . We refer to Refs. 73 and 74 for a further discussion of proposed approaches against the USD attack.
C. Finite-key security
Since the resources such as time and memory are finite, it is not sufficient to consider asymptotic security. Therefore, in Ref. 29 a finite-key analysis has been performed. To estimate appropriate bound on secure key rate we consider the notation of Renyi entropies
), because they describe the worst case and not the average one. In the paper we consider that α → ∞ since we use min-entropy H ∞ (X) = H min = − log max i p i . Thereby a quantum asymptotic equipartition property (QAEP) [84] is considered in order to bound ε-smooth min-entropy by von Neumann entropy. It means that for a large number of rounds, the operationally relevant total uncertainty can be well approximated by the sum over all i.i.d. rounds. In SCW QKD, conditional von Neumann entropy, or more precisely an entropy of Alice's bit conditioned on Eve's side-information in a single round, is bound as H(A|E) ≥ 1 − χ(ρ).
To provide the key extraction one should carry out the following steps.
(i) Parameter estimation. One should estimate the error rate (Bob publicly sends a random subset of k bits to Alice, and she estimates the QBER Q est in that subset) and detection rate at Bob's side.
(ii) Error correction. At this step both legitimate parties should check and correct the errors in their bit strings. It can be done using any error correction code.
(iii) Privacy amplification. In Reference 29, the privacy amplification has been studied using the bound from Ref. 85 , which tells us that the trace distance d between the protocol's output and an ideal output (where the key is uniform and independent from Eve, even after Eve knows the matrix used for the hashing) is bound above by
where in the last step the quantity ε sec is introduced as an upper bound on d. Reference 29 gives the final result that the protocol is ε corr -correct with ε corr = ε EC and ε sec -secure with ε sec = ε s + ε PA , hence ε QKD -secure-and-correct, with ε QKD = ε EC + ε s + ε PA providing secure bit string with length l = n(1 − χ(ρ)) − 4 √ n log 2 + √ 2 log 2 ε 2 S − −k − code EC (Q) − log 1 ε EC − log 1 ε PA + 2.
(12)
VII. CONCLUSION
The lack of security certification for quantum cryptography is ironic, since security is the main concern behind the shift from classical to quantum cryptography. In this work we have presented a methodology for security evaluation of a complete quantum communication system. To do so, we have subdivided the complete system implementation into seven layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow and categorised the implementation imperfections based on the hardness of the realised solution and practical risk. Using these classifications, we have evaluated the security of the SCW QKD system from ITMO University and Quantum Communications Ltd. We have found a number of potential security issues that need careful investigation by the manufacturer. Experimental tests, countermeasure and theory development have followed. As the result, most of the issues have been addressed, increasing the hardness rating of this implementation. We would like to add that a similar process is also going on with two other systems (by ID Quantique and QuantumCTek) that we earlier analysed. One important but sometimes overlooked aspect should be emphasised. When someone is in the process of designing a system, his mindset tends to become biased, and he may not be able to think from a different point of view and see security problems with his own design. This is the very reason the task of security certification should be done in collaboration with third-party experts whose main goal is to find problems. This helps a responsible QKD manufacturer to quickly assess and resolve the security issues, as has clearly happened in the case of ITMO. Furthermore, the third-party analysis should ideally begin during initial design considerations, rather than after the commercial implementation has been completed (as has been the case here).
We hope our security evaluation approach will pave the way towards development of a security certification methodology for existing and future quantum communication systems.
one-way (COW) QKD protocol with LDPC error correction (with a code rate 2/3) and security parameter of = 4 × 10 −9 . Next layer Q4 decides which subroutine to initiate: for instance, whether to adjust synchronization between the Alice and Bob QKD stations, optimise modulator voltages in order to maximize the interference visibility, or send qubits from Alice to Bob. The control is then transferred to layer Q3, which executes the chosen subroutines with help from Q2 and Q1. For example, when Q3 initiates the raw key exchange subroutine, the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) chip in Alice -at layer Q2 -outputs a stream of 1.25 Gbps digital pulses with adjustable amplitude and width to drive an intensity modulator that prepares the quantum signals. The latter are then sent over the fiber to Bob. Another FPGA at Bob -a layer Q2 device -outputs another stream of 1.25 Gbps pulses to provide the gating signals to the single-photon detectors and receives detection signals from these detectors. Here, the intensity modulators, fiber, and detectors all belong to layer Q1 that -together with components from layer Q2 -executes a subroutine initiated by layer Q3.
